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ABSTRACT
Many of the Supreme Court’s important holdings concerning campaign finance law are
not pure matters of constitutional interpretation. Rather, they are “contingent” constitutional determinations: the Court’s conclusions rest in substantial part on legislative facts about
the world that the Court finds, intuits, or assumes to be true. While earlier commentators
have recognized the need to improve legislative factfinding by the Supreme Court, other
aspects of its treatment of legislative facts—particularly in the realm of campaign finance—
require reform as well.
Stare decisis purportedly insulates the Court’s purely legal holdings and interpretations
from future challenge. Factually contingent constitutional rulings should, in contrast, be
more susceptible to future revision. The facts underlying contingent holdings may change,
litigants in a later case may present different evidence concerning those facts, social or technological developments may occur, new discoveries may be made, or a later court’s assessments or assumptions concerning those facts may differ. The Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence exhibits the opposite tendency of what theory would predict, however. The Court
has proven much more willing to revisit its purely legal interpretations of the First Amendment than its constitutionally contingent holdings.
Many of the Court’s campaign finance rulings pay insufficient attention to the importance of legislative facts. They reiterate holdings of prior cases as if they were pure declarations of law, without recognizing the underlying legislative facts upon which those holdings depend. This can lead future courts to overestimate these holdings’ binding force, overlooking their dependence on certain facts. Several cases also make critical assertions concerning legislative facts without citing support either in the record or from extrinsic sources.
Perhaps the biggest impediment to the effective use of legislative facts in campaign
finance cases is the vagueness of the decision rules the Court has crafted to implement the
First Amendment in this field. Many of the Court’s doctrines turn on standards—for example, whether an act poses a risk of apparent corruption—that are vague, underdefined, and
fail to provide litigants and future courts with sufficient guidance concerning the nature
and extent of evidence necessary to satisfy them. Such indeterminacy allows courts to resolve
campaign finance cases based primarily on subjective, ad hoc intuitions and preferences
rather than provable legislative facts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of constitutional law is far less settled than we generally
take it to be. For example, it is often stated, as a matter of blackletter law, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not
prohibit the government from using unconstitutionally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings.1 This declaration, a reflection of the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Calandra,2 appears to be
a matter of pure constitutional interpretation—that is, a pure statement of law.
That holding, however, is premised on the Calandra Court’s assessment of various facts, including the extent to which applying the
exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings would interfere with the
grand jury’s operations or deter police misconduct.3 Calandra stated,
“Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved
by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at
best. . . . [I]t is unrealistic to assume that application of the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings” would “deter[] . . . police misconduct . . . .”4
Thus, the Court’s conclusion does not rest primarily on legal
grounds, such as the Constitution’s text, structure, or history, but
rather on its assessment of a few key facts, including the extent to
which applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would
deter police from engaging in unconstitutional searches. That fact
1. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1990) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings.”); Investigations
and Police Practices, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 241 (2014) (“[T]he government
may introduce tainted evidence in . . . grand jury proceedings . . . .”); Melanie D. Wilson, An
Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010) (“[T]he exclusionary
rule . . . . does not preclude the government from using illegally-obtained evidence in grand
jury proceedings . . . .”).
2. 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974).
3. Id. at 350 (“Against this potential damage to the role and functions of the grand
jury, we must weigh the benefits to be derived from this proposed extension of the
exclusionary rule.”).
4. Id. at 351-52.
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does not arise directly from the Constitution itself, but rather is an
empirical assessment about the world as it existed at the time of the
Court’s ruling, and is by no means immutable, or even necessarily
correct. Indeed, Professor Seth Stoughton, a former police officer, has
demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s assumptions about police
officers’ motivations are often faulty and that police frequently conduct searches and make arrests to further a wide range of goals other
than achieving convictions.5
Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Ballew v. Georgia presents an even
more extreme example of the Justices’ reliance on extrinsic facts in
applying the Constitution.6 The defendant had been convicted of obscenity in state court before a five-member jury.7 He contended that
his conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 8
which he argued required a jury of no less than six people in criminal
cases.9 Justice Blackmun held that, as a matter of fact, “the purpose
and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired,
and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six
members.”10 Citing over nineteen sources, including books, studies,
articles, and student notes,11 he stated that empirical data suggests
that “progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective
group deliberation,”12 “the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller
and smaller panels” is doubtful,13 and “verdicts of jury deliberation in
criminal cases will vary . . . to the detriment of . . . the defense” as
“juries become smaller.”14 His interpretation and application of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial rested primarily on this empirical research concerning group decision-making, rather than the text,
original understanding, or history of application of the Sixth
Amendment itself.15

5. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 852 (2014) (“[T]here are
no formal mechanisms that would encourage officers to reevaluate the quality of their
arrests based on the conviction results, and informal pressures actively discourage officer
interest, leading officers to pay less attention to convictions than the Court assumes.”).
6. 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 226-27.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV.
9. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 227 (plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 239.
11. Id. at 231 n.10.
12. Id. at 232.
13. Id. at 234.
14. Id. at 236.
15. Id. at 232-34; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (upholding a
ban on partial-birth abortions based in part on the Court’s assumption that, despite the
absence of “reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” it is “unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained” and that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow”).
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Not all constitutional holdings share this dynamic. For example,
in Mahler v. Eby, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause16 did
not preclude the petitioners from being deported under an amended
immigration law based on crimes for which they had been convicted
before the law’s enactment.17 Citing the Court’s prior interpretation
of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Calder v. Bull, Mahler declared, “The
inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law . . . applies only
to criminal laws and not to a deportation act like this.”18 The Court
adjudicated this issue solely as a matter of law, based exclusively on
the Immigration Act and Ex Post Facto Clause, without taking into
account any empirical facts, generalizations, or assumptions about
the world.
All of these cases resulted in holdings that appear to provide definitive interpretations or applications of the Constitution. Calandra
holds that the government may use unconstitutionally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. 19 Ballew declares that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits states from using a five-person petit jury in a
criminal case.20 Mahler concludes that the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not bar the government from designating certain crimes as deportable offenses after they already have been committed.21 The first two
holdings, however, depend in large part on empirical, and potentially
changing (or even incorrect) facts about the world beyond the four
corners and legislative history of the constitutional clause
at issue.
This Article introduces the phrase “contingent constitutionality” to
refer to a constitutional holding that is based substantially upon—
that is, contingent upon—potentially falsifiable facts about the world,
commonly called “legislative facts.”22 As a matter of law, contingent
constitutional holdings should be treated as far less settled than
purely legal holdings (i.e., those based solely on the text, structure,
original intent or understanding, or history of application of the constitutional or legal provision at issue), and courts should be more
willing to reconsider them. The facts underlying contingent constitutional holdings may change, litigants in a later case may present dif16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974).
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39.

22. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; cf. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative
Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988)
(“Underlying every decision of an issue of law is a set of factual premises.”). See generally
Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 637, 640 (1966).
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ferent evidence concerning those facts, social change or technological
developments may occur, new discoveries may be made, or a later
court’s assessments or assumptions concerning those facts may
differ.
As holdings of prior cases are repeated in treatises, hornbooks,
articles, and subsequent cases, in isolation from the reasoning of the
underlying opinions, however, contingent constitutional rulings often
come to be treated as direct interpretations of the Constitution itself
that do not rest on intermediary factual findings or assumptions.23
Conversely, subsequent cases instead sometimes treat the factual
underpinnings of precedents as established legal principles, rather
than purportedly empirical statements or assumptions about the
world that are potentially susceptible to counterproof.24
This Article offers an analysis of contingent constitutionality, particularly in the campaign finance context.25 Part II begins by exploring the concept of contingent constitutionality in greater depth,
demonstrating that many important constitutional holdings rest on
legislative facts that are subject to continued change, evolving understandings, and new evidence. It contends that the judiciary, and in
particular the Supreme Court, should be more careful to ensure that
its discussions of case holdings distinguish between those which are
pure matters of law, and those which are contingent upon potentially
changing extrinsic facts. Part II further contends that courts should
be more willing to overturn contingent constitutional rulings than
those involving primarily legal determinations. Moreover, when
crafting legal tests and doctrines for applying constitutional provisions (i.e., constitutional decision rules),26 the Court should consider
whether it is reasonably possible for litigants to prove, or even provide meaningful evidence concerning, the legislative facts upon which
those decision rules rely.

23. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003) (“[R]estrictions on political
contributions have been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because contributions lie closer
to the edges than to the core of political expression.”); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on
contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent
spending.”).
24. See, e.g., Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342, 343 (2010)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 395-97 (2000) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 135-36 (2003) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
25. Other scholars, calling for reform of appellate courts’ factfinding, have identified
campaign finance jurisprudence as an area in which the Court relies on factual findings
and assumptions in crafting constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, The
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 28-31 (2011).
26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.

684

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:679

Part III turns to the specific context of campaign finance law, distinguishing the Court’s pure constitutional holdings from its contingent constitutional
holdings. This Part argues that, in the campaign finance context, the Court
has failed to recognize the importance of contingent constitutionality by refusing to reassess earlier cases’ contingent constitutional holdings based on
new or different evidence in subsequent cases. If anything, campaign finance
jurisprudence exhibits the opposite tendency: the Court has been far
more willing to readjust its purely legal interpretations of the First
Amendment than it has been to revisit its factually contingent holdings. 27 Moreover, the Court’s decision rules for applying the First
Amendment in campaign finance cases have provided very little guidance to litigants concerning the nature and extent of evidence necessary
to satisfy them. This Part explores these issues in three main areas of
campaign finance law: the Court’s refusal to recognize proxy speech as
pure speech entitled to full constitutional protection,28 its holdings concerning the validity of various contribution limits,29 and its declaration
that independent expenditures do not give rise to a risk of corruption.30
Part IV briefly concludes, arguing that the Court must be more attentive to the role of legislative facts in campaign finance cases. In particular, it should be willing to reassess its contingent constitutional rulings
in this field in the face of new evidence in subsequent cases.
II. CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY
At the foundation of every constitutional ruling lie operative propositions: pure statements of law in which the Court interprets the
Constitution’s meaning. 31 Typically, an operative proposition is a
statement of the general principle that a constitutional provision embodies. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment guarantees fundamental rights of political speech and
association.32
Many scholars contend that most constitutional rulings also are
based on decision rules: judicially created tests that courts employ to
determine whether the underlying operative propositions have been

27. See infra note 85.
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See infra Section III.B.
30. See infra Section III.C.
31. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); see
Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (2010).
32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.”).
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violated.33 For example, the Supreme Court has held that laws which
substantially burden pure speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,”
meaning they are valid only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.34 More limited restrictions on First
Amendment activities, in contrast, are subject only to a “rigorous”
form of intermediate scrutiny,35 requiring the government to demonstrate that they are reasonably tailored to further an important interest.36
Stare decisis insulates both operative propositions and decision
rules, to a substantial extent, from subsequent changes.37 It counsels
that “an argument that [the Court] got something wrong—even a
good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.”38 The Court has described stare decisis as “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”39 Although stare decisis is “not an inexorable command,” 40 departure from the doctrine “demands special
justification,”41 particularly where a principle has been applied in a
“long line of precedents.”42
Most constitutional decision rules require the Court to assess
certain facts. 43 A legal provision’s constitutionality seldom hinges
33. Berman, supra note 31, at 9; Laurin, supra note 31, at 1007-08. While the dispute
is immaterial to this Article, some scholars question whether it is accurate, meaningful, or
possible to distinguish between operative propositions and decision rules. See David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 207-08 (1988).
34. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
35. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444-45 (2014); accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
36. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 25.
37. Some commentators have argued that stare decisis applies with greater force to
operative principles than decision rules, since operative principles are the result of pure
constitutional interpretation, whereas decision rules are based in part on practical
implementation concerns. See Berman, supra note 31, at 113.
38. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
39. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); see also
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (describing stare decisis as “a
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the
sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is
not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion’ ” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490
(Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888))).
40. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
41. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
42. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2036. The Court considers several factors in
determining whether to abandon stare decisis, including whether the precedent has proved
unworkable, “the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course
whether the decision was well reasoned.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93
(2009).
43. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551-65
(1991) (discussing the role of legislative facts in numerous landmark Supreme Court
precedents); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT.
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primarily on “adjudicative facts” about the particular parties that
happen to be before the Court or the specific incident, instrument,
or transaction giving rise to the case, however.44 Instead, it usually
depends on facts about the world, collectively called “legislative
facts.”45 These include facts about how people typically think, act, or
feel under certain circumstances; the likely consequences of different
incentives or courses of action; and social meaning.46 “Facts having
constitutional magnitude range widely, from the effect of a railroad
licensing requirement on interstate commerce to the nature of
man.”47 Many legislative facts “are of a complex nature, built on an
intricate structure of data and inferences.”48
When determining adjudicative facts, courts are generally bound
by the rules of evidence. When determining legislative facts, in contrast, a court is neither required to follow the rules of evidence,49
nor limited to the evidentiary record.50 Rather, it is free to take judi-

REV. 75, 75 (1960) (“Judges make constitutional law as they make other kinds of law, on
the basis of facts proved and assumed.”).
44. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (2d ed. 1983).
Adjudicative facts necessary to resolve constitutional claims are sometimes referred to as
“constitutional facts,” Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
229, 230-31 & n.17 (1985), and are subject to de novo review in certain contexts, such as in
First Amendment cases, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 117 (1985); see also, e.g.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27 (1984); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). See generally Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J.
1427 (2001) (identifying various types of cases in which the Supreme Court will review
constitutional facts de novo). Monaghan contends that federal appellate courts generally
have discretion to review constitutional facts de novo, but are not required to do so. See
Monaghan, supra at 276.
45. See Karst, supra note 43, at 81, 98; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 365-66 (1942).
As with many attempts at categorization in the law, the line between adjudicative and
legislative facts can sometimes be blurry. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The
Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (2013) (discussing examples of
facts that are “neither purely legislative nor purely adjudicative”).
46. Some commentators have referred to this category of facts as “social facts.”
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 881 n.26 (1988).
47. Faigman, supra note 43, at 551 (footnote omitted).
48. Karst, supra note 43, at 100.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (providing that restrictions on a court’s ability to take
judicial notice do not extend to legislative facts); Keeton, supra note 22, at 31 (“[B]oth trial
and appellate courts, in making premise-fact decisions, are free to draw upon sources of
knowledge not admissible under the formal rules of evidence that apply to adjudicativefact finding.”).
50. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016, 2045
(2012) (“[F]ar more common is a willingness by appellate courts to consider new evidence
on legislative facts at every turn . . . .”); Gorod, supra note 25, at 6 (“[N]othing in the
current legal framework prevents a higher court from looking outside the record created by
the parties and relying on its own factual findings to reverse the trial court’s decision.”).
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cial notice of whatever legislative facts it wishes,51 and an appellate
court need not defer to a lower court’s findings on those issues.52 The
Advisory Committee note to the Federal Rules of Evidence explains
that a judge is “unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion”
when determining legislative facts.53 “He may make an independent
search for persuasive data, or rest content with what he has or what
the parties present.”54
In general, the Court is likely to begin by scrutinizing the evidentiary record that the parties assembled below,55 as well as their briefs
on appeal. Briefs that focus on presenting legislative facts often are
referred to as “Brandeis briefs,” after Louis Brandeis’ famous brief in
Muller v. Oregon56 containing over 100 pages of social science data
and other evidence concerning the consequences of long working
hours on women.57
In important constitutional cases, the Court typically receives
numerous amicus briefs containing legislative facts, as well. 58 The
Supreme Court virtually never denies leave to file an amicus brief.59
“In a recent term, . . . a total of 399 amicus briefs were filed in 74 of
the 79 cases decided. . . . Four or more amicus briefs were filed in
over half of the decided cases.”60 Many of these briefs, akin to Brande51. Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2044; see also Schauer, supra note 45, at 58 (“[T]he
phenomenon of reliance on external information to establish legislative facts has long been
part of the appellate landscape.”). See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme
Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) (providing an empirical examination of the
extent to which the Supreme Court conducts independent factual research).
52. See Keeton, supra note 22, at 41-43; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
168 n.3 (1986); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional
Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1188, 1190 (2013) (recognizing that it is “widely
believed” that appellate courts may review social facts “independently,” but arguing that
district courts’ findings concerning social facts should be subject to clearly erroneous
review).
53. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) adv. comm. note (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)); see also Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543, 548 (1924) (“[T]he Court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground
for laying down a rule of law.”).
54. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) adv. comm. note (quoting Morgan, supra note 53, at 270-71).
55. Ann Woolhandler emphasizes that litigants have a strong incentive to provide the
Court with as much supporting evidence as they can concerning pertinent legislative facts.
Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV.
111, 118, 121 (1988).
56. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
57. Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2049-50. See generally Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis
Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1958). Some commentators have critiqued Brandeis briefs
precisely because appellate courts can use them to adjudicate cases based on new facts that
were not introduced in the district court. See John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief—
Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts,
17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1993).
58. See Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2051-54.
59. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 751 (2013).
60. Id. at 756.
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is briefs, presented the Court with legislative facts from outside the
record. 61 Professor Allison Larsen’s empirical research identifies
problems with the Court’s reliance on amici.62 She demonstrates that
a substantial number of amicus briefs “cite a study that [the amicus]
funded itself,” assert facts based on information that is not publicly
accessible, or present evidence based on “methods which have been
seriously questioned by others working in the field.”63
Larsen’s research further demonstrates that the Court also frequently uses the Internet to conduct its own “in house” research into
legislative facts “without reliance on the parties or amici—at an
astonishing rate.”64 The Court may be more willing to rely on such
independent research in civil liberties cases than ones that turn primarily on economic issues.65 Many commentators, including Larsen,
have questioned the reliability of independent factual research that
judges perform themselves.66 She points out that the identities, qualifications, and biases of the authors of many websites, such as Wikipedia, often cannot be readily determined, and the websites’ content
is not subject to adversarial testing. 67 And judges sometimes do not
even bother doing such research, instead deciding cases based on
their own assumptions and intuitions about legislative facts.68
61. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1773
(2014); see also Gorod, supra note 25, at 35-37 (discussing the Supreme Court’s receptivity
to amicus briefs to help it engage in extra-record factfinding).
62. Larsen, supra note 61, at 1764.
63. Id.; see also Borgmann, supra note 52, at 1216 (contending that amicus briefs
often contain “dubious factual assertions”).
64. Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262; accord Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2057; Gorod,
supra note 25, at 57.
65. Karst, supra note 43, at 96.
66. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262-63 (pointing out that independent judicial
factfinding creates risks including “the possibility of mistake, unfairness to the parties, and
judicial enshrinement of biased data”); Layne S. Keele, When the Mountain Goes to
Mohammed: The Internet and Judicial Decision-Making, 45 N.M. L. REV. 125, 149-51
(2014); see also Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . . ”: An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987) (arguing that courts’
assessment of legislative facts is “often superficial” and “deeply problematic”); Gorod, supra
note 25, at 9, 11; cf. Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge:
Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417 (2002)
(outlining concerns with courts’ factual research on the Internet); Maurice Rosenberg,
Improving the Courts’ Ability to Absorb Scientific Information, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND JUDICIARY 480, 482 (William T.
Golden ed., 1988) (“The judiciary’s current method of absorbing scientific information on
legislative facts is haphazard, unruly and unreliable.”). Keeton has a more sanguine view
about the reliability of the judiciary’s factfinding capabilities concerning legislative facts,
though he recommends certain procedures to help ensure the accuracy of their findings.
Keeton, supra note 22 at 46-48.
67. Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262-63.
68. See Faigman, supra note 43, at 544-45; Gorod, supra note 25, at 56-57 (recognizing
that judges “may assume that a particular belief is established ‘fact’ even when there is no
basis for that assumption”); Larsen, supra note 51, at 1260 (recognizing that a court “can
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Unlike courts’ legal interpretations, the factual premises of their
rulings are not subject to stare decisis.69 As Kurst explains, “Much of
the law’s vitality comes from the willingness of courts to re-examine
findings of legislative fact to a far greater extent than they reexamine other propositions of law.”70 Litigants therefore should have
the opportunity to challenge the legislative facts upon which a purportedly binding precedent is based, as a way of demonstrating that
it is no longer valid.71
When courts, commentators, and litigants fail to distinguish between constitutional holdings that are based on pure interpretations
of law, and those that rest in large part on legislative facts, they inadvertently overestimate the binding nature of the latter by overlooking the factual contingencies upon which they are based. And even
when lower courts recognize that the Supreme Court’s holdings are
based on certain legislative facts, they might feel bound to continue
accepting those legislative facts as true, even in future cases that involve different legal provisions and litigants, despite record evidence
to the contrary.72
If litigants present evidence concerning a legislative fact that the
Supreme Court did not consider, a later court should determine
whether it affects the Court’s holding, rather than waiting the years
or decades it might otherwise take for the Court itself to reconsider
the issue. Likewise, as social changes, technological advances, new
research, or other developments undermine the legislative facts upon
which a ruling is based, courts should be willing to reassess whether
the factual premises, and therefore the holding, of a precedent remain valid. As Professor Stuart Minor Benjamin explains, “Appellate
opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are based.
When those facts evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is weakened as well.”73

simply assert an emphatic view of [a] fact with nothing to support the view except for
‘common experience’ ”).
69. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (holding that stare decisis does
not apply when “the Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions into agreement with
experience and with facts newly ascertained’ ” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“[N]o change in Roe’s factual underpinning has left its
central holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for overruling it.”).
70. Karst, supra note 43, at 108.
71. Id. at 109.
72. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 970 (1955); Gorod,
supra note 25, at 57, 64 (calling for lower courts to decline to apply findings of legislative
facts from higher courts’ precedents that appear incorrect).
73. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999).
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The Supreme Court reserves to itself the “prerogative of overruling its own decisions” when they rest on “reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions.”74 But this principle does not compel a future
court to follow a precedent that rests on facts that, based on the evidence before it, do not appear true. As is often the case with constitutional interpretation, this power may be abused, but it is a problem
that the Supreme Court may readily resolve through summary reversals and remands.
It might be objected that emphasizing the contingent nature of
precedents undermines their practical utility, because future litigants would be freer to challenge their factual underpinnings. 75
When a constitutional holding is based on certain legislative facts,
however, it is more faithful to the underlying decision rule for future
courts to confirm that those facts exist or continue to exist, rather
than relying on the Supreme Court’s findings, assumptions, or intuitions concerning those facts in a previous case, potentially from decades earlier. If the Court finds itself in persistent disagreement with
lower courts over the existence of particular legislative facts, the
Court might consider either reformulating its description of those
facts or modifying the decision rule to focus on different facts. Alternatively, if the Court wishes for a principle to apply regardless of
whether a particular legislative fact is actually true, it should impose
that principle as a matter of law—that is, as a matter of pure constitutional interpretation—without purporting to make it contingent
upon a factual condition.
At a minimum, the Supreme Court itself should be willing to overturn a ruling that is contingent on legislative facts it no longer accepts as true. For the Court to be in a position to do so, it must:
(i) be clear about which holdings are purely the result of direct constitutional interpretation, and which are contingent on legislative
facts; (ii) craft constitutional decision rules that identify the legislative facts upon which its rulings are based in terms that give meaningful guidance to both litigants and future courts, rather than relying on vague standards that implicitly encourage future courts to rely
on intuition; and (iii) avoid treating findings of legislative fact in
precedents as assertions of law that carry binding force in subsequent cases.

74. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989);
accord United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224 (2010).
75. See Benjamin, supra note 73, at 287 (recognizing that focusing on the facts
underlying constitutional rulings “undercut[s] the seeming permanence of appellate
decisions”).
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III. LEGISLATIVE FACTS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Modern campaign finance law is built around the fundamental
constitutional distinction between political contributions and independent expenditures.76 The Court has held that limits on contributions to candidates, political parties, and PACs impose only limited
burdens on First Amendment rights and therefore are subject only to
intermediate scrutiny. 77 Contribution limits generally survive such
scrutiny because they are reasonably tailored to furthering the government’s interest in fighting actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. 78 Independent expenditures, in contrast, are funds that a
person spends on political communications about federal elections
without direct or indirect suggestions, guidance, or input from a candidate or political party.79 Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has
held that, because independent expenditures constitute pure speech,
limits upon them are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost invariably unconstitutional.80
This dichotomy between political contributions and independent
expenditures relies extensively on legislative facts. 81 The Court’s

76. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
77. See id. at 26-28.
78. Id. But see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (holding that aggregate contribution limits are unconstitutional); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006)
(“[T]he specific details of Act 64’s contribution limits require us to hold that those limits
violate the First Amendment, for they burden First Amendment interests in a manner that
is disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance.”); McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003) (invalidating prohibition on political contributions by
minors).
79. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (Supp. II 2014).
80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-51; see also infra notes 179-92. But see Bluman v. FEC,
800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding law prohibiting foreign nationals other than lawful permanent residents from making independent
expenditures in connection with federal elections), aff’d without opinion, 132 S. Ct. 1087
(2012).
81. Most broadly, Buckley and its progeny rest on some general and largely
unobjectionable factual assertions about the importance of free political discussions in
maintaining a vibrant democratic government. 424 U.S. at 14 (“Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.”). Justices have expressed similar sentiments
throughout the Court’s history. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (declaring that a “robust exchange of ideas” leads to the “discover[y of]
truth”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (agreeing
that “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth”). Of course, as an empirical matter, it is
debatable whether full and robust political debate actually leads to a better-informed
electorate. See Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications,
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006)
(“[R]esearch in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics shows that humans operate
with significant, persistent perceptual biases that skew our interactions with information.
These biases undercut the assumption that people reliably sift data to find truth.”).
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rulings in this area, however, often fail to identify the evidentiary or
other basis that supports the Court’s findings. 82 And subsequent
cases often fail to distinguish between holdings that are pure interpretations of law and those that were contingent upon potentially
changing facts.83
As discussed above,84 sitting Justices might be particularly unwilling to revisit their purely legal interpretations of the First Amendment, especially due to stare decisis. Attacks on precedents’ factual
underpinnings, particularly attacks based on evidence the Court did
not previously consider, conceptually represent the most viable approach for seeking change. Several of the findings or assumptions
upon which the Court has based its holdings in campaign finance
cases are, at a minimum, dubious and potentially susceptible to counA large body of empirical research suggests that exposure to accurate evidence or data
often does not lead people to change their beliefs and can even cause them to cling to
contrary beliefs with even greater intensity. See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler,
When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 304
(2010); Monica Prasad et al., “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred
Justification, 79 SOC. INQUIRY 142, 144, 148, 153 (2009). Further reducing the efficacy of
political dialogue is what Dan Kahan and Donald Braman term “cultural cognition”: a
“series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to
conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the
activities subject to regulation.” Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 171 (2006). They argue that, “[b]ecause cultural
cognition determines what sorts of information individuals find reliable, culturally polarized
beliefs . . . stubbornly persist in the face of scientific advances in understanding.” Id.
Cognitive biases such as confirmation bias also can limit the impact of political debate.
See, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 329 (2015);
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2098 (1979). Molly Wilson has warned that political campaigns actively take advantage of
voters’ cognitive biases, rather than attempting to persuade them through reason and
evidence. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010).
Political discussions among like-minded people might lead them further from accurate
conclusions in other ways. Rather than facilitating the determination of truth, collective
deliberations can lead to the adoption of more extreme beliefs. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 88-90 (2000). And to
the extent that liberal and conservative beliefs are partly a function of brain anatomy or
functioning, robust expression and political debates may not affect people’s beliefs much at
all. See, e.g., David M. Amodio et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Liberalism and
Conservativism, 10 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1246, 1247 (2007); Ryota Kanai et al., Political
Orientations Are Correlated with Brain Structure in Young Adults, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY
677 (2011).
Thus, while the Court’s assumption that robust political debate will facilitate the
determination of truth appears facially reasonable, it is the kind of reflexive, intuitive
assertion that empirical research suggests, at a minimum, is likely overbroad and
somewhat inaccurate. It is the type of legal fiction, however, that the Court has strong
institutional reasons to accept as true, notwithstanding any counterproof.
82. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
83. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
84. See supra Part II.
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terproof in subsequent litigation. It bears emphasis, however, that
the Court’s rulings in this area have been the opposite of what one
might expect. It has shown greater willingness to revisit its purely
legal interpretations of the Constitution than the factual underpinnings of holdings that are contingent on critical legislative facts.85
The Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence also demonstrates
the importance of establishing constitutional decision rules that are
susceptible to meaningful proof, rather than calling for courts to base
their rulings in substantial part on guesses, intuitions, stereotypes,
or assumptions. In crafting many of its decision rules in this area, it
appears that the Court failed to consider the extent to which various
legislative facts can be concretely proven or the quantum or type of
evidence that would be sufficient to establish (or disprove) such
facts.86 Clearer, more specific constitutional decision rules would help
litigants develop their cases and allow future courts to adjudicate
campaign finance challenges more objectively.
This Part explores these issues as they arise in three different
contexts in campaign finance law. Section A explores the Court’s
holding that political contributions are entitled to minimal constitutional protection as a type of speech. Section B discusses the Court’s
rulings concerning the validity (or invalidity) of various types of restrictions on political contributions. Finally, Section C analyzes the
Court’s conclusion that independent expenditures generally cannot
be limited because they do not pose a risk of corruption.
A. Political Contributions as Speech
One of the core tenets of campaign finance jurisprudence over the
past forty years has been the Court’s holding that contribution limits
abridge First Amendment rights to a lesser extent than restrictions
on independent expenditures (i.e., pure political speech) and therefore are subject only to intermediate scrutiny.87 In Buckley v. Valeo,
the Court held that a contribution limit “entails only a

85. Compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152-54 (2003) (holding that the
government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption extends to preventing the
“purchase [of] influence” and the “sale of access” to officeholders), with Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S 310, 359-60 (2010) (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or
access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . . Ingratiation
and access . . . are not corruption.”).
86. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22.
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marginal restriction” on freedom of expression, as well as a more
substantial restriction on freedom of association (though not enough
to trigger full constitutional protection).88
The Court’s conclusion that political contributions entail only a
minimal communicative element is based on a mix of pure legal principles and conceptually falsifiable legislative facts. First, the Court
noted that “[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”89 This is definitionally true and does not
appear susceptible of empirical proof or disproof. Even if a contributor writes a note in the memo field of a check to explain why she is
providing the contribution, the contribution itself—the funds being
given to the candidate—does not convey that information. It is unclear, however, whether the vagueness of the expression that a contribution embodies remains constitutionally significant from a purely
legal perspective. Nearly a quarter-century after Buckley, the Court
held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston that:
[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a “particularized message,” would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.90

Second, the Buckley Court stated that the amount a person contributes does not send a meaningful message about the extent of his
or her support for the candidate.91 “At most,” the Court opined, “the
size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor’s support.”92 The Court added that to determine the
“intensity” of a contributor’s support for a candidate based on the
amount of his contribution, it would also be necessary to consider his
“financial ability and his past contribution history.”93
These legislative facts appear highly debatable and might reasonably be subject to counterproof in future litigation. Litigants might
be able to present public opinion surveys to demonstrate that most
members of the public draw a strong correlation between the amount
a person contributes to a candidate and the extent to which that
88. Id.; see also id. at 22 (recognizing that a contribution “serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate” and “enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance
of common political goals”).
89. Id. at 21.
90. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (citation omitted).
91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id. at 21 n.22.
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person “really” supports the candidate. Likewise, litigants could likely adduce evidence that most political parties and candidates regard
people who contribute higher amounts as their strongest supporters.
Indeed, many fundraising materials aimed at high-dollar contributors contain language to that effect.94
It is far from intuitive that a $20 contribution sends substantially
the same message as a $2700 contribution. Political contributions
present a clear case of “putting your money where your mouth is.”
Talk is cheap; a verbal expression of support often may seem far less
meaningful or significant than a monetary contribution. It is at least
reasonably possible that evidence in a subsequent case may lead the
Court to conclude that it underestimated the communicative value of
political contributions.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court reasoned that
contributions are distinguishable from speech because, although they
“may result in political expression” if the recipient spends the funds
“to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”95 California Medical Association (“CalMed”) v. FEC elaborated that a person cannot claim full First Amendment protection for
facilitating “proxy speech,” or speech by other people with which they
agree.96 The CalMed Court explained that a “sympathy of interests
alone does not convert” speech by the recipient of a contribution into
that of the contributor.97
This principle may be the most vulnerable part of the Court’s
analysis of contribution limits. Buckley elsewhere holds that the act
of spending money to subsidize speech may itself be treated as pure
speech. As the Court said of independent expenditures, “[T]he dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money [does not]
operate[] itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” 98 The reduced
constitutional protection for contributions therefore does not stem
from the fact that the contributor must spend money to subsidize the
recipient’s political speech, but rather that the contributor is seeking
to subsidize and adopt someone else’s message.
94. See, e.g., Maggie Haberman, Clinton Fund-Raising, for Starters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/04/12/clinton-fundraising-for-starters/?_r=0 (noting that supporters of Hillary Clinton who contributed the
maximum permissible amount of $2700 would “earn[] . . . status as ‘Hill-starters’ ”).
95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
96. 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (holding that “speech by proxy” through contributions to
a PAC “is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full
First Amendment protection”).
97. Id.
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
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Future litigants reasonably might be able to introduce expert and
lay evidence demonstrating that the identity of a speaker can have
more of an impact on whether an audience accepts a message than
the content of the message itself. Listeners might be more willing to
accept certain messages if they come from sources that share their
values,99 agree with them on most other issues, can speak from personal experience or knowledge, or otherwise have special credibility.
Barack Obama can speak about the perceived need for some AfricanAmerican men to play a greater role in their children’s lives in a way
that Mitt Romney, uttering the same words, could not.100 Marco Rubio similarly claimed he was uniquely situated to defend the Republican Party’s policies toward the poor, asking rhetorically, “If I’m our
nominee, how is Hillary Clinton going to lecture me about living
paycheck to paycheck?”101 He continued, “I was raised paycheck to
paycheck. . . . [H]ow is she going to lecture me about student loans? I
owed over $100,000 just four years ago.”102 More broadly, promises or
messages directly from candidates may be much more effective than
the same claims from third parties about those candidates.103
Aristotle’s Rhetoric conveyed this idea through the concepts of
ethos and pathos: appeals to the credibility of the speaker and the
emotions of the audience, respectively.104 To Aristotle, ethos was arguably the most important aspect of a message.105 The Court likewise
has recognized that the First Amendment protects the non-

99. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003).
100. See Julie Bosman, Obama Sharply Assails Absent Black Fathers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/16/us/politics/15cnd-obama.html?_r=0
(“ ‘Too many fathers are M.I.A, too many fathers are AWOL, missing from too many lives
and too many homes,’ Mr. Obama said . . . . Mr. Obama laid out his case in stark terms
that would be difficult for a white candidate to make, telling the mostly black audience not
to ‘just sit in the house watching SportsCenter’ . . . .”); see also Aamer Madhani, Obama:
There’s No Longer Time for Excuses for Black Men, USA TODAY (May 19,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/05/19/obama-morehouse-collegecommencement/2324241/ (“Obama spoke in very personal terms to the 500 young men as
he urged them to . . . become . . . good fathers and good husbands.”).
101. James Pindell, 7 Key Moments from the Republican Presidential Debate, BOSTON
GLOBE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/08/07/top-momentsfrom-republican-presidential-debate/VRNAPmyMtw5mCIZYPHc8RN/story.html.
102. Id.
103. Federal campaign finance law is premised, in part, on the notion that hearing
directly from a candidate has special significance. When a candidate takes advantage of
statutorily reduced rates to run an attack ad on cable television, the commercial must end
with either a “full-screen view of the candidate” declaring that she authorized the
advertisement, or a photograph of the candidate accompanied by a voice-over of the
candidate conveying that message. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2014).
104. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 38-39 (George A. Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007).
105. See id.
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rational, “emotive” aspects of communications, precisely because they
“may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated.”106
A mailer, television advertisement, or other communication from a
candidate or party may perfectly and perhaps even uniquely convey a
potential contributor’s feelings and beliefs. She may wish to subsidize
further dissemination of that communication (or similar ones), rather
than attempt to fund her own imitation of it.107 Many such contributors reasonably might believe that they cannot create their own mailers, websites, or other such communications of comparable efficacy,
particularly since candidates, political parties, and PACs typically
employ expensive consultants, public relations firms, and professional writers to prepare their materials.
The law of evidence recognizes this phenomenon as an adoptive
admission. Through her words or actions, a person may embrace a
third party’s statement as her own, and the statement will be legally
attributed to her.108 In the unique context of campaign finance jurisprudence, however, the Court deems such adoptive admissions as a
less accurate representation of a person’s beliefs, and far
less worthy of constitutional protection, than the person’s own independent speech. Litigants in future cases may reasonably be able to
compile an evidentiary record to persuasively challenge the Court’s
conclusion that contributions deserve reduced constitutional protection because “the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”109
Finally, the Court concluded that contribution limits impose no
more than “marginal” restrictions on speech because they do not “in
any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and
issues.” 110 The availability of alternate channels of communication
is a factual issue that appears indisputable. As discussed above,
however, a person’s physical freedom to personally discuss candidates and issues may not be nearly as meaningful as his ability to
adopt and facilitate expression by others with whom he agrees.

106. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
107. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985)
(“[C]ontributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and
want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their
money.”).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 735 (4th
Cir. 2006) (“The adoptive-admission doctrine permits statements of others to be treated by
the jury as statements of the party—it is as if the party himself made the statement.”).
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
110. Id. at 20-21.
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And the Supreme Court has come to recognize that alternative modes
of political involvement are seldom practically available when a person has an interest in multiple candidates.111
Thus, the Court’s conclusion that political contributions entail only a minimal expressive element is based on a mix of purely legal
premises that have been weakened by subsequent holdings and legislative facts that may be open to counterproof in future cases. PostBuckley case law has typically minimized or overlooked the factually
contingent nature of this holding, however. Both the Supreme Court
and lower courts often reiterate that political contributions involve
minimal expressive content as if that assertion were a matter of pure
constitutional law, rather than a conclusion based on the Court’s factual conclusions in Buckley. 112 Based on empirical research, expert
opinion, and evidence from political candidates and contributors, the
Court may conclude that either contributions in general, or contributions specifically to subsidize “speech by proxy” in particular, are entitled to full constitutional protection.113 Were the Court to conclude
that contributions are a fully protected form of speech, contribution
limits would be subject to strict scrutiny.114
B. Limits on Political Contributions
The Court’s precedents concerning the constitutionality of contribution limits purport to rest upon legislative facts, but in reality are
based primarily on ad hoc subjective judgments. The decision rule
the Court has crafted to determine the validity of contribution limits
is so vague and underdefined that courts lack sufficient guidance in
ascertaining whether it has been satisfied, and litigants have little
direction as to the nature, weight, or extent of evidence they must
adduce to carry their respective burdens. Moreover, the legislative
facts that the decision rule treats as dispositive appear to depend
mostly on judicial intuition.
Buckley held that contribution limits are constitutional if they are
“closely drawn” to furthering the government’s interest in preventing

111. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014) (“[P]ersonal volunteering is not
a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes.
Other effective methods of supporting preferred candidates or causes without contributing
money are reserved for a select few, such as entertainers capable of raising hundreds of
thousands of dollars in a single evening.”).
112. See, e.g., id. at 1444.
113. Cf. id. at 1462-63 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “[n]one of the [Buckley]
Court’s bases” for concluding “that contributions are different in kind from direct
expenditures . . . withstands careful review”).
114. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption. 115
Applying that standard, the Court upheld the validity of limits on
contributions to candidates. 116 The Court acknowledged that the
extent of corruption created by candidate contributions “can never
be reliably ascertained.”117 It found that the risk of corruption was
sufficient, however, to warrant contribution limits based on “deeply
disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election” which demonstrated “that the problem [wa]s not an illusory one.”118 The Court recognized that quid pro quo bribery was already independently prohibited and that disclosure requirements ensured that the government
and public would know about any large contributions to a candidate.119 It responded that Congress was “entitled” to conclude that
contribution limits are “a necessary legislative concomitant” to those
other measures.120
Buckley and its progeny leave unsettled a wide variety of issues
concerning the standard for determining when the specter of corruption is sufficient to justify particular contribution limits or other such
restrictions. The Court elaborated in a subsequent case that “[t]he
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”121 It remains unclear,

115. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. The Court has also identified various interests that are
constitutionally impermissible rationales for campaign finance restrictions. For example,
the government may not limit contributions to “equaliz[e] the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 48. The Court explained that the
First Amendment prohibits the government from “restrict[ing] the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.” Id. at 48-49; see also
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (“[I]t is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level
the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.’ ” (second alteration in original) (first quoting Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2811 (2011); then quoting Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); and then quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56)). Likewise, the
Government may not “determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration” by “taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others.” Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2010). Finally, the Government may not limit contributions to
prevent contributors from gaining “influence [over] or access [to]” government officials,
because “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.” Id. at 360; see also McCutcheon,
134 S. Ct. at 1451 (“[T]he Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”).
116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (“[L]imit[ing] the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions” is “a constitutionally sufficient
justification” for base limits on contributions to candidates.).
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 27-28.
120. Id. at 28.
121. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
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however, what exactly the government must prove in order to defend
a particular contribution limit.122 There are many possible interpretations, but none is entirely satisfactory.
It may be that a contribution limit is justified if a particular type
of transaction has any potential to corrupt a candidate. The Court’s
precedents do not support such an interpretation, however. For example, as discussed in the next Section,123 the Court has consistently
held that the risk of corruption associated with independent expenditures is too remote to warrant restricting them. Alternatively, the
Court could implicitly be applying a threshold, requiring the government to show that a certain percentage of instances of a particular
type of transaction involves quid pro quo corruption or that some
non-negligible number of such transactions has led to such corruption in the past. But the Court repeatedly has upheld contribution
limits despite its recognition that the vast majority of even large contributions do not involve corruption.124 Prohibiting a practice to prevent corruption when the overwhelming majority of instances of such
conduct are not corrupt eviscerates any pretention of “closely drawn”
tailoring.
It appears that the Court instead might be applying an objective
standard, asking whether a particular type of contribution, in the
Court’s view, poses a reasonable likelihood of corrupting a candidate
or officeholder. Such a standard places less weight on empirical evidence and appears to turn primarily on the Court’s subjective intuitions about politics and politicians, making jurisprudence in this area
unnecessarily subjective and unpredictable. Further, it is unclear
what constitutes a “reasonable” or “unreasonable” likelihood of corruption or how a future court should go about attempting to make
that determination. Relying on such an ad hoc approach, rather than
more concrete principles, also tends to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s rulings in this highly charged and politicized
area.125
These difficulties are even greater when attempting to weigh the
government’s interest in combating “the appearance of corruption”
posed by a particular type of contribution.126 Conceptually, apparent
122. See id. (“While Buckley’s evidentiary showing exemplifies a sufficient justification
for contribution limits, it does not speak to what may be necessary as a minimum.”).
123. See infra Section III.C.
124. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“[R]estrictions on direct
contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve
quid pro quo arrangements.”); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014).
125. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that constitutional cases should rest on principles and reasoning
that transcend immediate outcomes and generate consistent decisions).
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
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corruption may exist even in the absence of actual corruption. The
Court has failed, however, to provide standards for determining the
magnitude or validity of such concerns. For example, is the
appearance of corruption to be determined based solely on the
perspective of a member of the general public, someone familiar with
all the details of the transaction at issue, or someone familiar
with campaign finance law and First Amendment doctrine? The
ability of individuals to contribute unlimited amounts of money
to SuperPACs, 127 and of SuperPACs (like other PACs) to spend
unlimited amounts of money on political advertisements, 128
reasonably might be seen as potentially corrupting to a member of
the public who is aware of neither the concept of an “independent
expenditure” nor the Court’s view that such expenditures do not
create a risk of corruption.129
Similarly, is the issue whether a reasonable person possibly could
conclude that a particular transaction involves quid pro quo corruption, or that he likely would do so, or that a majority of the public
would find the transaction questionable? The frustrating vagueness
of the Court’s appearance-of-corruption standard allows it to effectively determine the constitutionality of campaign finance laws based
primarily on its intuitions and assumptions, rather than more concrete legislative facts susceptible to proof or falsification.
The Court’s subsequent rulings concerning contribution limits
purport to follow Buckley. The vagueness of Buckley’s decision rule
for determining the validity of contribution limits and the indeterminacy of the legislative facts upon which it is based, however, have
caused the Court to reach conflicting conclusions about different
types of limits without clear differences in the underlying evidentiary
records. The Court’s rulings concerning contribution limits appear to
be based more on subjective ad hoc determinations than the underlying legislative facts that Buckley deems dispositive.
This Section will focus on three examples: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, which upheld state-level contribution limits;130 McConnell v. FEC, which upheld federal limits on soft money
contributions to state and local parties but invalidated a blanket prohibition on contributions from minors; 131 and McCutcheon v. FEC,
which invalidated aggregate contribution limits.132
127.
128.
(1985).
129.
130.
131.
132.

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
528 U.S. 377, 381-82 (2000).
540 U.S. 93, 164-67, 231 (2003).
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452, 1461 (2014).
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1. Shrink Missouri
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Eighth Circuit
had invalidated Missouri’s limits on contributions to candidates
for certain state offices.133 Although Buckley had upheld the constitutionality of contribution limits, the Eighth Circuit properly recognized that this holding was not a pure interpretation of the Constitution, but rather was contingent upon legislative facts, including record evidence concerning “perfidy . . . in federal campaign financing in
1972.”134 The Eighth Circuit refused to “infer that [Missouri] state
candidates for public office are corrupt or that they appear corrupt
from the problems that resulted from undeniably large contributions
made to federal campaigns over twenty-five years ago.”135 It therefore
required the State to “prove that Missouri has a real problem with
corruption or a perception thereof as a direct result of large campaign
contributions.”136
The State’s only evidence, according to the court, was an affidavit
of the senator who co-chaired the committee that enacted the contribution limits. The affidavit offered his opinion that “there was the
‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits were not enacted, and that
contributions greater than the limits ‘have the appearance of buying
votes.’ ”137 The Eighth Circuit concluded that this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate that contribution limits
would further the State’s interest in combatting corruption.138
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Buckley is “authority
for comparable state regulation” of political contributions.139 Quoting
extensively from Buckley, the Court held that Missouri’s contribution
limits furthered the State’s interest in battling corruption.140 It declared that “the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible.”141 It went on to opine that the senator’s affidavit, as well
as some newspaper articles introduced in the district court (which
the Eighth Circuit did not mention) discussing actions various government officials took that favorably impacted large contributors,

133. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 520, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.1(1)), rev’d sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000).
134. Id. at 522.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 (2000).
140. Id. at 386-90 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-16, 20-22, 24-28, 30 (1976)).
141. Id. at 391.

2016]

CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY

703

“substantiat[e]” concerns about corruption in Missouri.142 The Court
concluded, “[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no
reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among
voters.”143
Buckley treated the validity of limits on contributions to federal
candidates as a constitutional issue to be resolved in large part based
on certain underlying legislative facts, most notably including the
risk of actual or apparent corruption such contributions cause. Nixon,
however, significantly downplayed the contingent nature of Buckley’s
holding, treating contribution limits, in effect, as prima facie valid.
The Court was largely unwilling to consider evidence concerning
Missouri politics in particular or the remarkable differences in circumstances between present-day Missouri and the federal government of a quarter-century earlier. Nor was the Court receptive to
possible differences in public perception of federal corruption and
Missouri politicians.
2. McConnell
In McConnell v. FEC,144 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
provision in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) limiting
“soft money” contributions to political parties.145 Soft money is a label
applied to funds used by political parties to pay for something other
than contributions to federal candidates, coordinated expenditures
with federal candidates, or communications that clearly advocate the
election or defeat of a federal candidate.146 Prior to BCRA, the most
common uses of soft money were for activities aimed at state or
local elections, voter registration drives, get-out-the-vote campaigns,
generic party advertising, and issue advocacy. 147 During that preBCRA era, federal contribution limits did not apply to soft money;
political parties could accept unlimited amounts of such funds. BCRA
effectively eliminated soft money; the Act provides that any funds
that a national, state, or local political party uses in connection with
a federal election must be raised in compliance with federal contribution limits.148

142. Id. at 393.
143. Id. at 395.
144. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
145. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101(a)-(b), 116
Stat. 81, 82-86 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30125 (Supp. II 2014)).
146. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123 (2003).
147. Id.; see also Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional
Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 181-82 (1998).
148. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 323.
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The Court upheld BCRA’s extension of contribution limits to soft
money,149 including section 323(b), which limits soft money contributions to state and local political party committees.150 The Court held
that section 323(b) was “designed to foreclose” circumvention of
limits on contributions to national political parties “by sharply curbing state committees’ ability to use large soft-money contributions to
influence federal elections.” 151 The Court pointed out that federal
candidates and national parties sometimes “ask donors who have
reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state
committees.”152 It opined that “[t]here is at least as much evidence as
there was in Buckley that such donations have the intent—and in at
least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal officeholders.”153 The Court went on to observe that it was “ ‘neither novel
nor implausible,’ for Congress to conclude that . . . federal candidates
would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been
to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties.”154 It
later reiterated that “[c]ommon sense dictates” that federal candidates would be grateful for soft money contributions to state parties
to be used to subsidize voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts
that may benefit them.155
To the extent the Court relied on “common sense” rather than
record evidence in reaching its conclusions, it may have improperly
reduced the government’s burden in defending the constitutionality
of laws that impinge upon First Amendment rights. This approach
effectively shifts the burden to those challenging the law to demonstrate that the Court’s “common sense” is wrong by proving a negative: that contribution limits do not give rise to a potential for corruption. It is unclear what evidence would be necessary to accomplish
such a task, such as the absence of any bribery prosecutions based on
contributions to state parties, or testimony from candidates as to the
relative lack of importance of soft money contributions to state and
local political parties.
Supporters of campaign finance reform should not necessarily
embrace the Court’s use of “common sense” as a barometer for determining the constitutionality of contribution limits, however. As
discussed in the next Section, the Court’s intuitions have led it to
conclude—in the apparent absence of empirical evidence—that inde149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 169, 173.
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 323(b).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 164-65.
Id.
Id. at 165 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000)).
Id. at 167.
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pendent expenditures categorically do not give rise to a risk of quid
pro quo corruption.156 And even the McConnell Court’s common sense
did not lead it to uniformly uphold restrictions on contributions.
Another BCRA provision prohibited minors from contributing to
candidates or political parties.157 McConnell held that this prohibition
violated minors’ First Amendment rights.158 The government argued
that the ban prevented parents from circumventing their contribution limits by funneling additional contributions through their children. 159 It had presented evidence in the district court of four instances of parents doing so.160
The Supreme Court rejected this rationale on the grounds that the
government offered “scant evidence” that such circumvention was
actually occurring.161 It stated, “Absent a more convincing case of the
claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened scrutiny.” 162 The Court also pointed out that
BCRA’s prohibition on making a contribution in another person’s
name already prohibits parents from contributing funds through
their children.163
The Court’s unwillingness to recognize the potential for circumvention through minors’ contributions stands in stark contrast with
its concern over soft money contributions to state and local parties.
With both provisions, the government asked the Court to speculate
that a lack of regulation could lead to corruption. The Court was willing to assume that soft money contributions to state parties would
cause federal officeholders to be grateful and lead to potential corruption164 but, as discussed below, refused to apply similar reasoning to
independent expenditures. 165 It was also unwilling to assume that
contributors might route money through their children to circumvent
contribution limits.166

156. See infra Section III.C.
157. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 318, 116 Stat. 81,
109 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30126 (Supp. II 2014)).
158. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231.
159. Id. at 232.
160. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 717-18 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of KollarKotelly, J.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003).
161. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441f (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (Supp. II 2014))). The
Court further held that a complete prohibition on contributions from minors was
“overinclusive” and that more narrowly tailored means of preventing circumvention were
available. Id.
164. Id. at 165.
165. See infra Section III.C.
166. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232.
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The contrasts among these rulings arise in part from the indeterminacy of the decision rules the Court is applying. Neither Buckley
nor its progeny clearly or specifically identify how “real” or “certain”
a potential for corruption must be, the extent to which the government must show that corruption of that type has occurred in the
past, or the frequency with which it will occur. Moreover, the legislative facts underlying these holdings cannot definitively be ascertained based on objective evidence. They unavoidably rest in substantial part on the Court’s subjective judgments about human nature, tolerance for risk, and speculation about the future. Consequently, the Court has flexibility to accept a relatively minimal showing in one context, approving contribution limits on soft money contributions to state and local parties, while insisting on a heightened
showing in another context, by invalidating a prohibition on contributions from minors.
3. McCutcheon
Finally, in McCutcheon v. FEC, 167 the Supreme Court held that
the risk of actual and apparent corruption was insufficient to support
aggregate limits on the total amount that a person may contribute to
all candidates and political committees in an election cycle. 168 The
Court reasoned that, so long as each contribution a person makes is
under the statutory base limit, there is no reason to effectively limit
the number of such non-corrupting contributions she may make
through an aggregate limit.169
The government also had failed to show that contributors would
likely try to circumvent the base limit on contributions to a particular
candidate by making large contributions to numerous other entities
that would, in turn, contribute to that candidate. In one of the most
critical sentences in the opinion, the Court stated, “[T]here is not the
same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money
flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor
contributes to a candidate directly.”170 The Court did not cite any evidence, whether anecdotal, expert, or even polling, to support this critical assumption. Rather, it explained that when a contributor provides funds to a PAC, and the PAC in turn decides to contribute

167. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
168. Id. at 1456, invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012) (recodified at 52
U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3) (Supp. II 2014)).
169. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
170. Id.
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that money to a candidate, “such action occurs at the [PAC’s] discretion—not the donor’s,” because the donor “must by law cede control
over the funds.”171
The Court recognized that when a donor makes the maximum
permissible contribution to many of a party’s candidates, “all members of the party or supporters of the cause may benefit, and the
leaders of the party or cause may feel particular gratitude.”172 It did
not believe, however, that “such shared interest, standing alone,”
presents “an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption.” 173 While
McCutcheon was correctly decided, it is another example of how the
boundary between legal holdings and findings of legislative fact is
blurry, and many legislative facts the Court must ascertain are difficult to establish.
4.

Reconsidering the Role of Legislative Facts in Contribution
Limits

The precedents discussed throughout this Section establish many
principles. Contribution limits generally are permissible because
they impose only limited restrictions on association and minimal
restrictions on speech.174 Limits on soft money contributions to political parties are constitutional,175 aggregate contribution limits176 and
prohibitions on contributions by minors 177 are not. Each of these
assertions appears to be a pure statement of law directly interpreting
the Constitution but, in truth, each rests on factual assertions and
assumptions that, at least in concept, remain subject to challenge in
future cases. When courts, commentators, and counsel either assert
these propositions divorced from the facts upon which they are
contingent, or instead quote an opinion’s factual premises as if they
were binding legal rulings, they subtly misrepresent and, over time,
undermine the contingent nature of these holdings.
This pastiche of rulings concerning contribution limits stems in
part from the vagueness of the underlying decision rule the Court is
purporting to apply. The Court has held that contributions may be
limited to prevent corruption, but it has not adopted a clear or consistent position on whether the corruption must be proven or may be
merely assumed; the frequency, likelihood, and extent of corruption
necessary to warrant such restrictions; when other statutory re171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 1461.
Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 169, 173 (2003).
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1434.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231-32.
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strictions may be deemed sufficient to prevent such corruption; or
the perspective from which an act must be viewed to determine
whether it appears corrupt. Accordingly, it is difficult for a litigant to
determine in advance of a ruling whether any collection of evidence is
sufficient to make a restriction constitutional. Greater specificity in
the decision rule would help future courts base their rulings on legislative facts rather than assumptions or intuition.
C. Independent Expenditures
As discussed earlier, nearly a half-century of campaign finance
case law is built upon Buckley’s dichotomy between contributions and
independent expenditures. That dichotomy, in turn, is based on the
Court’s assertion in Buckley that independent expenditures do not
give rise to a constitutionally cognizable risk of corruption.178 Buckley
declared that the “absence of prearrangement and coordination of
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates
the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate.”179 A substantial chunk of
modern campaign finance law rests upon this seemingly unassuming
premise.
Based on this assertion, the Court consistently has struck down
limits on independent expenditures by nearly every type of speaker
that has come before it, including individuals, 180 PACs, 181 political
parties 182 and, in its much-maligned decision in Citizens-United, 183
corporations.184 Similarly, the overwhelming majority of circuits has

178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 51 (holding that FECA’s “independent expenditure limitation is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment”). But see Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d
281, 288 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding law prohibiting foreign nationals other than lawful permanent residents from making independent expenditures in connection with federal elections), aff’d without opinion, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
181. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985)
(“[T]he PACs’ [independent] expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection . . . .”).
182. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (holding
that a political party’s independent expenditures “fall[] within the scope of the Court’s
precedents that extend First Amendment protection to independent expenditures”).
183. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., Lili Levi, Plan B for
Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After Citizens
United?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 98 (2011); William Alan Nelson II, Buying the Electorate:
An Empirical Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme
Court Erred in Not Revisiting Citizens United, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 446 (2013).
184. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (invalidating prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures because “the Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
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held that political committees that solely make independent expenditures (colloquially referred to as “SuperPACs”) have a First Amendment right to accept unlimited contributions.185 As the D.C. Circuit
explained:
In light of the [Supreme] Court’s holding as a matter of law
that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or
create the appearance of corruption. The Court has effectively held
that there is no corrupting “quid” for which a candidate might in
exchange offer a corrupt “quo.”
....
. . . [T]he government can have no anti-corruption interest
in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only
organizations.186

Some courts have gone even further, allowing political committees
that make political contributions to establish separate, segregated
accounts (“Carey accounts”) that may accept unlimited contributions
to fund their independent expenditures.187
Thus, both SuperPACs and Carey accounts—and the hundreds
of millions of dollars in political spending for which they
account188—owe their existence to the Buckley Court’s assertion that
independent expenditures cannot be corrupting because the “ab479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (holding that “restriction of independent spending is
unconstitutional as applied to” certain non-profit corporations).
185. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that
contribution limits are “unconstitutional as applied to individuals’ contributions” to “an
unincorporated nonprofit association” that “intends to engage in express advocacy” and will
“operate exclusively through ‘independent expenditures’ ”); see Wis. Right to Life State
PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no valid governmental
interest sufficient to justify imposing limits on fundraising by independent-expenditure
organizations.”); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d
684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nor has the City shown that contributions to the Chamber PACs
for use as independent expenditures raise the specter of corruption or the appearance
thereof.”); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is
‘implausible’ that contributions to independent expenditure political committees are
corrupting.”); see also N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 n.1 (2d Cir.
2013) (“[T]he threat of quid pro quo corruption does not arise when individuals make
contributions to groups that engage in independent spending on political speech.”).
186. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694-96 (emphasis added).
187. See Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126-27, 131 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge
panel); see also Republican Party v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2013);
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, No. 09-CV-2862-IEG (BGS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6563,
at *38-40 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012).
188. 2012
Outside
Spending,
by
Super
PAC,
OPEN SECRETS. ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last
visited Apr. 1, 2016) (noting that 1310 SuperPACs spent a total of $609,417,654 in 2012);
see also Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1672-75 (2012).

710

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:679

sence of . . . coordination” between the candidate and the entity
making the expenditure “undermines” its value to that candidate.189
On its face, this appears to be a factual assertion. Yet, as others have
recognized,190 Buckley did not provide any empirical basis for this assertion, and it has seldom been subject to empirical analysis or reconsideration in later cases. Like the Court’s view in McCutcheon
that an officeholder cannot be corrupted by contributions to candidates other than himself,191 its conclusion in Buckley concerning independent expenditures’ lack of corrupting influence appears to be a
matter of intuition, rather than evidence. And, through repetition,
this intuition has hardened into a principle that, in the words of the
en banc D.C. Circuit, is now deemed settled “as a matter of law.”192
If the Court wished to interpret the First Amendment as categorically prohibiting restrictions on independent expenditures, it should
have framed that conclusion as a direct interpretation of the Constitution itself: a true matter of law. 193 Buckley’s approach, however,
presents the right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures
as a contingent assertion. If a future litigant were able to demonstrate that independent expenditures can corrupt politicians, the
right to make such expenditures without limit would evaporate. But,
as with the Court’s decision rule concerning contribution limits,194 it
has never explained the nature of the factual showing that would be
necessary to demonstrate the corrupting potential of independent
expenditures.
Thus, putting aside the substance of the Court’s doctrine concerning independent expenditures, Buckley’s reasoning concerning independent expenditures is the worst of all worlds for all sides. For supporters of unlimited independent expenditures, Buckley frames that
right in unnecessarily precarious terms. If Buckley is read literally,
the right does not exist as a matter of pure constitutional interpretation, but rather is contingent upon the Court’s factual belief that independent expenditures are categorically unable to create a risk of
actual or apparent corruption. Even if the Court respects stare decisis and does not change its interpretation of the First Amendment,
the right to make unlimited independent expenditures can be overturned if a future litigant convinces the Court that they pose some
unspecified risk of actual or apparent corruption. And as independent
189. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
190. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 25, at 30; Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 59, 63, 94-95 (2013).
191. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450-52 (2014).
192. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
193. Cf. Larsen, supra note 190, at 109 (arguing that the Court was “not really finding
facts” but rather “building bright line rules”).
194. See supra Section III.B.
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expenditures exceed a billion dollars per election cycle,195 it is virtually inevitable that, at the very least, some sort of apparent quid pro
quo incident will eventually occur.
For opponents of independent expenditures, Buckley presents a
tantalizing target that somehow is always hovering just out of reach.
Buckley—as interpreted and applied in Citizens United196—suggests
that the Constitution would not protect the right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures if they were shown to give rise to actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. Yet the Court has never
clarified what, exactly, a litigant must demonstrate to satisfy this
standard. How many apparent quid pro quo arrangements must be
proven for independent expenditures to become subject to regulation?
Would public opinion polls about the appearance of corruption be sufficient? Opinion testimony from current or former members of Congress?
To the extent courts such as the D.C. Circuit declare that independent expenditures are not corrupting as a matter of law,197 they
confuse legislative facts with legal holdings. Such confusion elevates
a holding that purports to be contingent upon certain underlying
facts into a direct interpretation of the Constitution itself. The Court
itself treated its factual findings about independent expenditures as
if they were legally binding holdings protected by stare decisis in
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock.198 The plaintiffs in Bullock filed a lawsuit in Montana state court, challenging a Montana
law that prohibited corporations from making independent expenditures concerning state candidates or political parties. 199 The State
introduced affidavits and deposition excerpts in defense of the ban
describing Montana’s long history of corruption.200 In the early 1900s,
corporations had spent tremendous sums of money to influence state
elections and officeholders, and effectively controlled state government.201
The State’s evidence showed that contemporary Montana remained subject to outside corporate influence because “the resources
upon which its economy depends . . . depend upon distant markets.” 202 One affidavit explained that “even small expenditures of
195. See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902,
1916 (2013).
196. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359-61 (2010).
197. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
198. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
199. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)).
200. W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
201. Id. at 8-9.
202. Id. at 9.
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money can impact Montana elections.” 203 Due to the state’s small
population, campaigns in Montana are “marked by person-to-person
contact and a low cost of advertising compared to other states.”204
Allowing unlimited corporate independent expenditures would shift
the emphasis of campaigns to fundraising.205 Former state officials
also testified that, because they had funded their statewide campaigns with a total of only a few hundred dollars, they “could have
been derailed by an opposing expenditure of even a couple of thousand dollars.”206
Based on this evidence, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the
state’s ban on independent expenditures by corporations.207 Although
Citizens United had been decided only the year before, the court concluded that it was not controlling, since its holding was based on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s factual findings concerning federal elections
and the evidence before it.208 The Montana Supreme Court emphasized, “[T]he factual record before a court is critical to determining
the validity of a governmental provision restricting speech.”209
The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the State had
“unique and compelling interests” in prohibiting corporate independent expenditures. 210 It held, “Issues of corporate influence, sparse
population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign
costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of democracy and the republican form
of government.”211
It is doubtful that the evidence before the court was sufficient to
justify a prohibition on independent expenditures by corporations.
Some of the evidence the court relied upon involved the corrupting
effect of large campaign contributions and therefore was marginally,
if at all, relevant to corporate independent expenditures.212 Similarly,
it does not appear that any of the examples of bribery the court
discussed involved independent expenditures. Much of the opinion
203. Id.
204. Id. at 10.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 13.
208. Id. at 6 (“Citizens United was decided under its facts or lack of facts . . . .”).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 11.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., id. at 10 (explaining evidence that “voters were concerned that they
‘didn’t really count’ in the political process unless they can make a material financial
contribution”); id. (“[Three] of [four] Americans believe that campaign contributions affect
judicial decisions in states where judges are elected.”).
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focused more on concerns about corporate “influence” over Montana
elections and “control” of state government213 than specific quid pro
quo corruption, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held is the only
valid basis for restricting political spending.214 The Montana Supreme
Court also feared that unlimited independent expenditures would
reduce voters’ interest and willingness to participate in the political
process.215 Such concerns appear completely speculative and, in any
event, are not grounds for limiting First Amendment activities.
Despite the shortcomings of the Montana Supreme Court’s opinion, it properly recognized that Buckley’s and Citizens United’s holdings concerning independent expenditures were not matters of pure
constitutional interpretation, but rather were contingent on certain
legislative facts. And the Montana Supreme Court believed that the
State had established that different legislative facts existed concerning Montana elections, thereby warranting restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures in Montana that may be unconstitutional
elsewhere, under different circumstances.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a terse, one-paragraph, 5-4
decision.216 It noted that Citizens United had invalidated a federal
law that was “similar” to Montana’s on the grounds that “political
speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its
source is a corporation.” 217 The Court held that “[t]here can be no
serious doubt” that “the holding of Citizens United applies to the
Montana state law.” 218 It added that Montana’s arguments “either
were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully
distinguish that case.”219 Four Justices strenuously dissented, pointing out that Citizens United should not “bar the Montana Supreme
Court’s finding, made on the record before it, that independent
expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the
appearance of corruption in Montana.”220
The Bullock majority exemplifies the Court’s careless treatment of
legislative facts in campaign finance cases. If the Court wished to
categorically preclude any governmental entity from limiting independent expenditures as a matter of law, without regard to the existence of extrinsic facts, then it should have framed its conclusion in
213. Id. at 9-10.
214. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450-51 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 340-41, 359-61 (2010).
215. W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 11.
216. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (quoting Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010)).
217. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Buckley and Citizens United as a purely legal assertion, rather than
a factually contingent holding. If, instead, an entity’s First Amendment right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures hinges
on the existence or absence of certain facts, the Court should be
clearer and more specific about what a litigant must establish to satisfy the Court’s standard, and more willing to examine future litigants’ factual records.
As discussed above with regard to contributions,221 it is unclear
what evidence either a supporter of unlimited independent expenditures or a governmental entity seeking to regulate them must adduce
to establish whether such expenditures by particular entities or in
certain elections may lead to actual or apparent corruption. Would
public opinion polls be sufficient? How much, if any, background
must people be given about the distinctions among contributions,
coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures before
being polled? Would testimony from former government officials be
sufficient? Can the Court draw important inferences from evidence
that government officials have acted favorably toward individuals or
entities who had made independent expenditures supporting their
candidacies? The Bullock Court’s approach, which effectively precludes litigants from demonstrating that independent expenditures
can give rise to actual or apparent corruption under certain circumstances, improperly disregards the contingent nature of Buckley’s
and Citizens United’s holdings.
Above all, the Court must avoid allowing a litigant to attempt to
establish a legislative fact through definitional sophistry. Buckley
held that independent expenditures cannot give rise to a risk of corruption because, by definition, they do not involve “prearrangement
and coordination” between the speaker and a candidate.222 The Court,
in large part, defined away the possibility of corruption. Under the
Court’s view, if Congress were to redefine “contribution” as the transfer of funds to a candidate for reasons unrelated to a quid pro quo
transaction, then a contribution could not, by definition, give rise to a
risk of corruption, either. Money given to a candidate as part of a
bribe or other corrupt quid pro quo arrangement would be excluded
from the definition of “contribution.” If the Court wishes to continue
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on First Amendment
activities based on the likelihood they might involve actual or apparent corruption, then it cannot allow the risk of corruption to be simply defined out of existence.
221. See supra Section III.B.
222. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). If an expenditure was prearranged with a
candidate, it would be deemed a coordinated expenditure rather than an independent
expenditure, see 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (Supp. II 2014), and treated as a contribution
subject to base limits, id. § 30116(a)(7)(C).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—has paid insufficient attention to the critical role of legislative facts in its constitutional holdings, particularly in campaign finance jurisprudence. Most
basically, in discussing precedents, courts sometimes fail to distinguish between holdings that are pure statements of law, based solely
on the Constitution itself, and those that are contingent upon underlying legislative facts. When factually contingent holdings get repeated in later cases, divorced from their underlying factual premises,
they appear to be statements of law subject to stare decisis and sometimes are treated as such. Moreover, when a court treats a contingent
holding as binding without assessing the continued accuracy of the
underlying facts, it affords the holding improperly strong binding
force. At least in theory, both legislative facts and legal holdings that
are contingent upon them should be subject to challenge in future
litigation, in which the litigants may compile a very different evidentiary record, without regard to stare decisis.223
In campaign finance cases, the Court also has paid inadequate
attention to whether the legislative facts upon which its decision
rules are based are reasonably susceptible to meaningful proof. Many
of the Court’s standards are far too vague, giving litigants scant
guidance as to how they can be satisfied. Such indeterminacy leaves
courts free to resolve important constitutional questions based primarily on intuition, reaching conclusions that can be both difficult to
predict and reconcile with each other.
These are not partisan critiques. Few people find current campaign finance law completely satisfactory. In some respects, paying
greater attention to the role of legislative facts in the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence may lead to greater constitutional protection. The Court may conclude, for example, that it has underestimated the extent to which contributions constitute a form of constitutionally protected speech. In other respects, it may lead to reduced
protection; for example, courts may find themselves more open to
considering evidence (if it exists) of actual or apparent quid pro quo
corruption from independent expenditures. At a minimum, greater
focus on the issue can lead to more coherent, predictable, and perhaps even persuasive rulings.
More generally, focusing on the factually contingent nature
of many constitutional rulings offers an exciting and potentially unsettling perspective on constitutional law. The need to reduce constitutional law to hornbook principles, treatises, and outlines often abstracts away from its true, much more complex nature. Principles of
223. See generally Larsen, supra note 190 (arguing that factual statements from the
Supreme Court should not be treated as authoritative in future cases).
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constitutional law that appear established—at least unless the Court
changes its interpretation of the Constitution—instead depend upon
certain facts about the world. Those facts might not have been adequately proven in a prior case or may be subject to new or different
evidence in future cases. Focusing on the factually contingent nature
of constitutional rulings, rather than their legal holdings alone, is
like perceiving what appears to be a solid block of wood instead as a
collection of atoms, separated by gulfs of space. What appears to be
definitive is, upon closer perception, contingent; what appears to be
an assertion of law is, upon closer analysis, largely factual. Such
shifts in focus can lead to illuminating insights, even when we
already know that such complexity is lying just beneath the surface.

